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I 
ONE OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL TENETS of international law is that it determines the permissible limits of the jurisdiction of States.! 
While issues relating to the exercise of State jurisdiction may extend to every 
aspect of human conduct, the crux of the matter is criminal jurisdiction.2 
Criminal jurisdiction is vested in a given State only when there exists between 
that State and either the specific offense or the alleged offender a legitimate 
link, that is to say, a link which is legitimate in the eyes of international law. In 
the absence of such a legitimate link, the State is not entitled to assert criminal 
jurisdiction. 
Five principles have emerged in international law as legitimate bases for the 
exercise of the criminal jurisdiction of States over alleged offenders. 
• TerritoriaUty, namely, the fact that the offense was committed within the 
territory of the State asserting jurisdiction {including ships and aircraft 
registered therein}. Although this is ostensibly the simplest base of criminal 
jurisdiction, it must be appreciated that the question of whether an offense 
actually takes place within the territory is not always easily answered. Above 
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all, it is difficult to determine when an act committed outside-yet having 
effects inside-the territory comes within the scope of legitimate criminal 
jurisdiction.3 
• Nationality of the alleged offender (or "active personality"), namely, the fact 
that the person charged with the offense is a national of the State asserting 
jurisdiction. In most instances in which criminal jurisdiction is exercised by a 
State, the circumstances would satisfy both the territoriality and the active 
personality principles, inasmuch as the criminal act is perpetrated by a national 
within the geographic confines of the home country. Hence, the real need for 
invoking the active personality principle per se arises chiefly when the offense is 
committed by a national extraterritorially. The active personality principle 
usually also covers serving the State in different capacities (such 
as members of the diplomatic service or of the armed forces), and at times it is 
even extended to permanent residents. 
• Nationality of the victim of the offense (or "passive personality"), namely, the 
fact that-irrespective of the situs of the offense and the nationality of the 
perpetrator-the victim is a national, or conceivably even a permanent resident, 
of the State asserting jurisdiction. Strong opposition has often been expressed 
against the passive personality principle when standing alone, viz., when a 
national of State A is prosecuted by State B for criminal activity affecting 
nationals of State B carried out within the boundaries of State A (or even State 
C).4 All the same, in at least some settings the passive personality principle is too 
well entrenched in State practice today to be seriously contested.5 
• Protection of certain vital national interests of the State, namely, authorizing a 
State to exercise criminal jurisdiction irrespective of location or nationality 
(even when the alleged offenders are foreigners and they acted 
extraterritorially). The "protective" principle is circumscribed to acts against 
the national security of a State; counterfeiting its currency, national emblems, 
seals or stamps; forgery, fraud or perjury committed in connection with official 
documents, especially passports and visa permits; and improper use of or insult 
to the national flag.6 
• Universality, namely, "the authority of the State to punish certain crimes 
wherever and by whom[soever] committed."7 This authority, which is vested 
in every State regardless of territory and nationality, is limited to the exercise of 
jurisdiction over delicta juris gentium (i.e., acts defined as crimes by 
international law). The view that the universality principle encompasses 
"common crimes such as murder," although shared by several scholars, is not in 
conformity with customary internationallaw.8 Had the universality principle 
been applicable to a broad range of ordinary crimes, there would be no raison 
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d'etre for the other bases of jurisdiction. After all, universal jurisdiction's 
"limitless scope renders all other forms of jurisdiction superfluous.,,9 The 
universality principle must be looked upon as an exceptional measure granting 
the State special extraterritorial powers. It is limited to specific offenses defined 
by international law, and it must be exercised strictly in accordance with 
limitations imposed by that law. 
Actually, the universality principle does not apply in an automatic fashion to 
all international offenses, although there seems to be a presumption today in 
favor of such application.1o A prime example of an international treaty, which 
defines an international offense yet explicitly adheres to the territoriality-
rather than the universality-principle, is that of Article 6 of the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.ll 
II 
The universality principle is strongly rooted in customary international 
criminal law. The incontrovertible "prototype,,12 is the law for the 
suppression of piracy (currently codified in Article 105 of the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea}.13 Over the last few decades, 
universal criminal jurisdiction has been extended to numerous other offenses 
by conventional international law (see infra), and in at least some instances the 
extension has in all likelihood already crystallized into generally binding 
custom. 
The proposition that belligerent States are accorded an international legal 
right to prosecute members of the enemy armed forces charged with war crimes 
has long been doctrinally recognized j 14 and was authoritatively restated in the 
early part of the twentieth century.1S It was reaffirmed in connection with the 
horrendous war crimes of World War II, even prior to the postwar trials.16 
These trials have had a salutary impact on the progressive development of 
international law in general (e.g., insofar as the evolution of the separate 
concept of crimes against humanity is concerned) Y One of their invaluable 
achievements is that the postwar trials removed any plausible doubt that might 
have lingered about the practice of States confronted with war crimes. The 
trials established, first and foremost, that all belligerents into whose hands war 
criminals have fallen can exercise concurrent jurisdiction.tB The trials further 
demonstrated that belligerent States have jurisdiction over war crimes 
perpetrated by enemy civilians as much as by members of the enemy armed 
forces. 19 Additionally, the trials made it plain that a belligerent State is entitled 
to bring to justice not only enemy nationals but also nationals of allied or 
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neutral States,20 and that it can even assume jurisdiction over war crimes 
committed before its own entry into the warY The corollary is that neutral 
States can equally prosecute belligerent war criminals.zz 
In the Eichmann trial, the Israel Supreme Court-which unequivocally 
endorsed the application of the universality principle to war crimes23 -arrived 
at the conclusion that "no importance attaches to the fact that the State of 
Israel did not exist when the offenses [including war crimes] were 
committed."24 This position has been reinforced by the judgment of the United 
States Court of Appeals (Sixth Circuit) in the Demjanjuk case of 1985: 
Further, the fact that the State ofIsrael was not in existence when Demjanjuk 
allegedly committed the offenses is no bar to Israel's exercising jurisdiction under 
the universality principle. When proceeding on that jurisdictional premise, 
neither the nationality of the accused or the victim(s), nor the location of the 
crime is significant. The underlying assumption is that the crimes are offenses 
against the law of nations or against humanity and that the prosecuting nation is 
acting for all nations. This being so, Israel or any other nation, regardless of its 
status in 1942 or 1943, may undertake to vindicate the interest of all nations by 
seeking to punish the perpetrators of such crimes.25 
The extension of the purview of jurisdiction over war crimes of all stripes is 
perfectly justifiable. The import of bringing the universality principle to bear 
upon war crimes is that all States without exception-rather than merely 
belligerent possessed of the power to mete out justice to any war 
criminal and that they can ignore the geographic, temporal, or national 
dimensions of the offense.26 While some scholars continue what may be called 
a rear,guard action against acceptance of the universality principle as 
appertaining to war crimes,27 by now it must be abundantly clear that the issue 
has been settled in customary internationallaw.28 Patently, war crimes can be 
assimilated to piracy in the frame of reference of universality ofjurisdiction.29 
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims 
include a common stipulation governing "grave breaches" of these 
instruments: 
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons 
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave 
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its 
courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own 
legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party 
concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie 
case.30 
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In accordance with Article 85(5) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions, the grave breaches referred to (as well as those 
supplemented by the Protocol itself) "shall be regarded as war crimes."3! 
In the opinion of the present writer, the text of the common clause of the 
Geneva Conventions constitutes a pellucid expression of the universality 
principle. True, this is not unanimously avowed. One eminent scholar argues, 
"The view that the 1949 Geneva Conventions provide for universal 
jurisdiction, though sometimes asserted, is probably incorrect."32 But surely, 
the correct interpretation of the Geneva text is the one offered by 
Hans,Heinrich Jeschek: 
According to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, signatory States are not only 
empowered to punish war crimes, but also are obliged to do so, unless the accused 
is extradited to another signatory State (aut dedere aut punire). The duty to 
punish attaches not only to the States to which the accused owes his allegiance 
or to the injured State, but to all the signatory States; this duty even extends to 
neutrals in an armed conflict, and it exists without regard to the nationality of 
the perpetrator or victim or to the place where the crime took place. Hence the 
Geneva Conventions provide universal jurisdiction for the punishment of war 
crimes coupled with a duty to prosecute, since the goal is the protection of 
common and universal interests.]J 
It is sometimes contended that only more serious war crimes (like the grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions)-rather than war crimes of a technical 
nature-activate the universality principle.34 But this is a misconception. The 
correct view is that technical violations of the laws of war simply do not 
constitute war crimes.35 Once violations of the laws of war qualify as war 
crimes, all come under the sway of the universality principle. 
In 1996, the International Law Commission defined War Crimes in Article 
20 of its Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.36 
Although, in part, the definition may give rise to debate,37 it mostly consists of 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and ProtocoPS Article 8 of the 
Draft Code39 "establishes the principle of the concurrent jurisdiction of the 
national courts of all States parties to the present Code based on the principle 
of universal jurisdiction" for crimes set out in Article 20.40 
III 
The universality principle embraces solely offenses established and defined 
by international law, with a view to protecting the interests of the international 
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community in its entirety. It must not be confused with the protective 
principle, which applies to the national interests of individual States. Both 
principles admittedly lead to a similar outcome: States may assert criminal 
jurisdiction over foreigners acting extraterritorially. Nevertheless, the two 
principles proceed from radically different points of departure. One principle is 
designed to protect the single State against those trying to subvert its vital 
interests. That single State, which is the only one affected, is exclusively 
allowed to take action-no other State can invoke jurisdiction on its behalf 
(although any State may act on the ground of territoriality or active personality 
where appropriate). The second principle is equally protective, but it lends its 
aegis to the collectivity of States (the "family of nations"). "It is founded upon 
the accused's attack upon the international order as a whole."41 All States are 
supposed to have a stake in suppressing delicta juris gentium, and all are 
simultaneously endowed with the authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction. 
Consequently, as a rule, there cannot be a genuine overlap between the 
universality principle and the protective principle. The present writer disagrees 
with the reliance on the protective principle-as an auxiliary base of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, side by side with the universality principle-by the 
District Court ofJerusalem (with the approval of the Israel Supreme Court), in 
the context of genocide, in the Eichmann tria1.42 However, even if 
genocide directed at the entire Jewish people can be exceptionally construed as 
impinging upon the vital interests of the State of Israel (albeit perpetrated 
before the birth of the State), thereby triggering the protective principle, only 
the universality principle is apposite to war crimes. 
There is no similar disconnection between the universality principle, on the 
one hand, and the territoriality, active personality, or passive personality 
principles, on the other. Universality postulates the irrelevance of either 
territory or nationality (of the victim as well as the offender). Still, if the 
territorial State or the State of nationality-when actually asserting criminal 
jurisdiction-prefers to act as such without invoking the universality principle, 
nothing prevents it from doing so. International law enables any State to tum a 
blind eye to the territorial or national link once universality is vouchsafed, but 
there is no compulsion to do so. When a State prosecutes members of its own 
armed forces who have committed war crimes, it benefits from an 
incontrovertible advantage if it acts in the name of the active personality 
principle rather than the universality principle. The trial can then be 
predicated solely on the domestic military penal code and need not take into 
account the limitations imposed on the State when availing itself of the special 
powers emanating from the universality principle.43 By contrast, if the State 
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wishes to prosecute enemy soldiers as war criminals, it has no alternative but to 
act within the framework of the universality principle (unless the victims are its 
own nationals or the crimes were committed on its territory). 
IV 
When the universality principle is applicable, the outcome is concurrent 
jurisdiction of all States. If all States acquire jurisdiction, all can exercise it. 
Evidently, U[c]oncurrent jurisdiction is no obstacle to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by any Yet, when (as in the text of the 
Geneva Conventions) the universality principle is couched in a binding 
language, amounting to a duty-rather than in a permissive manner simply 
creating a right-the potential competition engendered by the multiplicity of 
choices of forum must be addressed. Hence, the duty incurred under the 
Geneva Conventions and other instruments is generally represented in 
optional terms: either to render or to prosecute the accused.45 Normally, the 
Latin formula is adduced: aut dedere aut judicare. The alleged offender can be 
rendered to another State (principally through the mechanism of extradition) 
for the exercise of foreign jurisdiction.46 Still, when no such rendition takes 
place (because extradition is either not sought or denied, or for whatever other 
reason), there is a manifest duty to proceed with the exercise of local 
jurisdiction. The main thing is that one State or another will exercise its 
concurrent jurisdiction, so that an offender does not go 
All too often (perhaps especially where war crimes are concerned), there are 
problems with both alternatives, judicare and dedere. States may be reluctant or 
even unable to institute judicial proceedings themselves. In Theodor Meron's 
words: 
Universal jurisdiction over war crimes means that all states have the right under 
international law to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the offenders. Most states 
do not have the necessary resources or interest to prosecute offenders when the 
state itself was not involved in the situation in question. Many states also do not 
have national laws in place that allow them to prosecute offendersY 
At the same time, extradition-if sought-is frequently frustrated for 
technical or other reasons.48 
As against the factual situation where no country is 
overeager to prosecute war criminals, it is necessary to pose the reverse state of 
affairs (however rare) wherein several countries vie to lay hands on the 
accused, each desirous of exercising in practice its respective (concurrent) 
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jurisdiction. The question is whether any particular State, by dint of being more 
closely linked to the case at hand, has a better claim and therefore priority. 
No general rule regulating this matter has evolved in general international 
law. It is noteworthy, however, that no less than ten conventions pertaining to 
international criminal law have established a hierarchy formula in which a 
measure of priority is conferred on certain States (without negating the 
jurisdiction of others). The trail,blazing provision appears in Article 4 of the 
1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
which reads: 
1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the offence and any other act of violence against 
passengers or crew committed by the alleged offender in connection with the 
offence, in the following cases: 
(a) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft registered in that 
State; 
(b) when the aircraft on board which the offence is committed lands in its 
territory with the alleged offender still on board; 
(c) when the offence is committed on board an aircraft leased without crew 
to a lessee who has his principal place of business or, if the lessee has no 
such place of business, his permanent residence, in that State. 
2. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary 
to establish its jurisdiction over the offence in the case where the alleged offender 
is present in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any 
of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
accordance with nationallaw.49 
What is the correct interpretation of Article 4 ?50 In effect, the drafters of the 
Convention set forth that every State has a right (and indeed a duty) to 
exercise jurisdiction over the offense of aircraft hijacking. All the same, a 
double,tiered structure of jurisdiction is constructed. There are three preferred 
States with primary jurisdiction: the State of registration of the aircraft, the 
State where the aircraft lands with the offender still on board, and the State of 
the operator of the aircraft when it is on lease.51 The expectation is that in the 
natural order of things, one of the three preferred States will be able and willing 
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to exercise jurisdiction over the offender. However, should this not come to 
pass owing to failure of extradition, whichever State has the hijacker in its 
hands is entitled and required to prosecute him, in keeping with the maxim aut 
dedere aut judicare. 
The double,tiered structure of jurisdiction (with different lists of preferred 
States, as the subject matter dictates) is also adopted in the following 
conventions pertaining to international criminal law: 
• Article 5 of the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation.52 Here there are four 
preferred States: the State of territoriality plus the three States enumerated in 
the Hague Convention. 
• Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents.53 The three preferred States are the State of territoriality (explicitly 
including ships and aircraft registered therein), the State of nationality, and the 
State of passive personality (determined by virtue of function rather than strict 
nationality) . 
• Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of 
Hostages.54 The four preferred States are the first two listed in the 1973 
Convention (plus a discretionary jurisdiction over habitual residents who are 
stateless), the target State, and (where the State considers it appropriate) the 
passive personality State (based on the nationality of the victim). 
• Article 8 of the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materia1.55 The two preferred States are the first two indicated in the 1973 
Convention (without reference to stateless persons). There is also a specific 
reference in another paragraph to the State of export or import. 
• Article 5 of the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.56 The three preferred States 
are again the first two catalogued in the 1973 Convention (without provision 
for stateless persons), and the last of the 1979 Convention. 
• Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.57 The three preferred States are the 
flag State of a ship, the State of territoriality, and the State of nationality. Three 
other States are on a lesser standing, but still preferred in relation to the rest: 
the State of stateless habitual residents, the State of passive personality (based 
on nationality), and the target State. The interests of the flag State in case of 
several requests for extradition are particularly accentuated in Article 11 (5) .58 
The priority claim of the flag State to exercise jurisdiction is still not absolute, 
but it should have greater weight.59 
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• Article 4 of the 1988 United Nations Convention against lllicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.6o The two preferred States are 
the State of territoriality and the State of the vessel flying its flag or the aircraft 
registered in it. A lesser status is bestowed on the State of nationality or 
habitual residence (irrespective of statelessness) and two additional special 
cases. 
• Article 9 of the 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, 
Use, Financing and Training ofMercenaries.61 The two preferred States are the 
first two enumerated in the 1979 Convention. 
• Article 10 of the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personne1.62 The two preferred States are the first two listed in the 
1973 Convention. The 1988 Maritime Convention formula of three 
semi,preferred States is also repeated. 
In all, notwithstanding inevitable variations in the multifarious instruments, 
the fundamental approach is the same. Whereas some preferred States are 
endowed with primary jurisdiction-with no mandatory priority-what 
emerges in the final analysis is universal jurisdiction.63 It goes without saying 
that none of the conventions cited is germane to the issue of war crimes. Still, 
in future practice the nonbinding preference scheme may be looked upon with 
favor in that setting too. As for the choice of the States with a preferred status, 
judging by the trend highlighted in the conventions, it is probably safe to 
prognosticate that the three States to be generally deemed most closely 
connected to war crimes would be: the State of territoriality (including ships 
and aircraft registered therein), the State of active personality, and the State of 
passive personality. 
v 
Concurrent jurisdiction of all States over war criminals-in consequence of 
the universality principle-means not only that the judicial authorities of each 
State separately can sit in judgment over alleged offenders, but that any 
combination of States can set up an international penal tribunal with a view to 
carrying out the same mission on a multinational level. Thus, in the 1945 
London Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis (initially adopted by the four big powers-the 
United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France-and later acceded 
to by many other Allied nations), an International Military Tribunal was 
established.64 Pursuant to Article 6 of the Tribunal's Charter, it had 
jurisdiction over war crimes as well as crimes against peace and humanity.65 
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Following a celebrated trial conducted at Nuremberg, the 1946 Judgment 
proclaimed that in creating the International Military Tribunal the 
Contracting Parties to the London Agreement had "done together what any 
one of them might have done singly.,,66 In other words, given the umbrella of 
the universality principle, either the United States or any other country could 
have prosecuted Nazi war criminals while acting alone. In joining forces, the 
Contracting Parties to the London Agreement merely pooled together their 
resources, avoided competition and conflict, and ensured that justice would be 
done. 
This is also the best rationalization for the creation by the UN Security 
Council, in Resolution 827 (1993), of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia,67 with subject,matter jurisdiction, inter alia, over grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of the laws and customs of 
war (Articles 2,3 of the Tribunal's Statute).6B The legitimacy of the 
establishment of the Tribunal by fiat of the Security Council has been called 
into question by some commentators the background of the UN 
Charter.69 The Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal rejected at some length a 
challenge to its jurisdiction on that score.70 Without getting into this complex 
issue, which is beyond the scope of the present paper, it must be perceived. that 
irrespective of the range of powers allocated in the UN Charter, the 
establishment by the Security Council of an international penal tribunal with 
jurisdiction over war crimes is sanctioned by the universality principle. The 
Member States of the United Nations have done together what of them 
might have done singly. No doubt, universal jurisdiction "is not synonymous 
with centralised jurisdiction," but the two are not mutually exclusive either.71 
When an international penal tribunal is installed for the trial of war 
criminals, a problem that immediately comes to mind is whether the ordinary 
option of aut dedere aut judicare endures and whether the international tribunal 
has a status merely resembling that of an ordinary foreign court (with the same 
loose guidelines of preference in extradition discussed supra). Article 9 of the 
Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal addresses the issue head on, and while 
confirming the concurrent jurisdiction of national courts, decrees that the 
Tribunal "shall have primacy over national courts" and that the Tribunal may 
formally request the latter to defer to its competence.72 
The notion of primacy of an international tribunal over national courts was 
assailed by the defense in the T adic case. The Appeals Chamber of the 
Yugoslav Tribunal held that when an international penal tribunal is created, "it 
must be endowed with primacy over national courts," for otherwise stratagems 
may be used to defeat the purpose of diligently prosecuting international 
27 
The Universality Principle and War Crimes 
offenders.73 The Tribunal's explanation is conspicuously valid; indeed, perhaps 
the primacy concept should be construed within the ambit of that explanation. 
Intervention by an international penal tribunal in national proceedings (when 
a State wishes to exercise jurisdiction over a person in its custody) should not 
be undertaken unless there is reason to suspect that otherwise international 
justice is liable to be obstructed. In essence, this was also the opinion expressed 
by several Permanent Members of the Security Council in the course of its 
debates.74 
This brings up a related issue. One of the most salient human rights 
recognized by contemporary international law is freedom from double 
jeopardy: no one can be retried for an offense for which he has already been 
finally convicted or acquitted by a competent court.75 The pleas of autrefois 
acquit or autrefois convict are universally accepted as effectively barring further 
prosecution for the same offence. 
Under Article 86 of Geneva Convention III, the principle of non bis in idem 
applies to prisoners of war, who may not "be punished more than once for the 
same act or on the same charge.,,76 This provision, which covers the 
prosecution of war criminals, is applicable when double jeopardy is derived 
from the operation of judicial authorities in the territory of a single State. But 
what about transboundary retrials of war criminals (or other international 
offenders)? The matter seems to be unsettled in customary international law. 77 
However, this writer believes that the concept of non bis in idem should apply in 
principle to attempts by courts of several States to prosecute the same person 
for the same offense-while invoking the universality principle-no less than 
it does to parallel attempts by courts of an individual State. There is in fact 
doctrinal support for the position that a State ought to have no criminal 
jurisdiction over persons who have already been prosecuted elsewhere for the 
same offense.78 
A vexing issue arises, however, in the singular context of concurrent 
jurisdiction over war crimes (and other international offenses). There may be a 
disquieting apprehension that the judicial authorities of a particular State who 
view the acts of the alleged offender with leniency (owing to ethnic, political, 
ideological Dr religious motivations) would go through the motions of a sham 
trial and either acquit him or impose on him-after conviction-a nominal 
sentence, thereby thwarting the administration of justice. If justice is to be 
done (and especially appear to be done), this apprehension must be dispelled. 
Article 10 of the Yugoslav Statute handles this matter with finesse.79 In 
paragraph 1 it pronounces that no person shall be tried before a national court 
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for criminal acts for which he has already been tried by the International 
Tribunal. Paragraph 2 provides: 
2. A person who has been tried by a national court for acts constituting serious 
violations of international humanitarian law may be subsequently tried by the 
International Tribunal only if: 
(a) the act for whiLh he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary 
crime; or 
(b) the national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were 
designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, 
or the case was not diligently prosecuted. 
Paragraph 3 adds that in imposing a penalty the International Tribunal shall 
take into account any sentence served by a convicted person as a result of an 
earlier national trial. 
Attention should be drawn to the fact that apart from the scenario of 
spurious or biased national proceedings, the text of the Yugoslav Tribunal's 
Statute also permits retrial if the original prosecution related to ordinary 
crimes. This is quite sensible. As indicated by the International Law 
Commission, should an individual be tried by a national court for a "lesser 
crime" (that is, national rather than international), the prior decision of that 
court should not immunize him from subsequent international proceedings 
expected to "encompass the full extent of his criminal conduct."so 
The non bis in idem formula-used in the Yugoslav Tribunal's Statute-was 
replicated in the 1994 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwandaj81 it 
was followed by the International Law Commission (the same year) in Article 
42 of the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court.82 However, the 
formula does not come to grips with the prospect of a trial by a national court of 
State A subsequent to a trial for the same offense by a national court of State B. 
The International Law Commission, in Article 12 of its 1996 Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, after reiterating the same 
formula in regard to international proceedings, goes on to specify that retrial by 
a national court of another State is allowed if that other State is the territorial 
State or was the main victim of the crime.83 This is a most unsatisfactory 
solution to the dilemma, applying as it does even in the absence of any claim 
that the previous proceedings entailed a travesty of justice or that they were 
other than impartial. This writer is convinced that the same formula ought to 
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apply to retrial by the national courts of another State as by an international 
tribunal. 
VI 
There are three dimensions to the criminal jurisdiction of States under 
international law: jurisdiction to prescribe (i.e., to legislate), jurisdiction to 
adjudicate (i.e., to put on trial), and jurisdiction to enforce (i.e., to punish).84 
The need to distinguish between the three facets of jurisdiction becomes 
prominent when the principle of universality is invoked, as in the case of war 
crimes. 
Jurisdiction to Prescribe. Ex hypothesi, once the universality principle applies, 
no State is vested with jurisdiction to prescribe in the full sense of the term. 
The major premise underlying the universality principle is that the forbidden 
acts are delicta juris gentium, meaning that they have been criminalized by 
international law. The State "must ensure that its legislation does not extend 
the definition of the offense beyond the limits of internationallaw."s5 It must be 
fully appreciated that only acts branded as war crimes by international law are 
subject to universal jurisdiction. Therefore, the domestic legal system is not 
free to add its own versions of putative war crimes to the list prescribed (and 
proscribed) by international law. Should the domestic legal system label as "war 
crimes" acts not deemed war crimes by international law, the universality 
principle would not be in effect. Only war crimes juris gentium can sustain a 
claim to universal jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction to prescribe in the context of the universality principle has to be 
understood in a different sense. Every State has a right-and indeed a duty-to 
enact any enabling legislation required to lay the foundation for the domestic 
prosecution and punishment of international offenders. Such enabling 
legislation is ordained by each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949: "The 
High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to 
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be 
committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the 
following Article."s6 
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate. Jurisdiction to adjudicate in criminal matters means 
the prosecution and trial of offenders. Traditionally, jurisdiction to adjudicate 
has been treated as "ancillary to jurisdiction to prescribe."S? However, in the 
case of the universality principle, every State is vested with jurisdiction to 
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adjudicate notwithstanding the absence of jurisdiction to prescribe in the full 
sense of the term. 
When a State exercises its universal criminal jurisdiction to adjudicate by 
sitting in trial over war criminals, it must of course comply with all the 
standards of due process oflaw, as demanded by internationallaw.88 The duty 
devolving on a State in the absence of dedere is consequently only one of 
judicare rather than punire. It is entirely possible that indictment of an alleged 
offender will end in acquittal. 
The prosecutorial authorities in the State wherein the alleged offender 
happens to be present must have discretion in assessing the case at hand: much 
depends on where the witnesses and the rest of the evidence are. It is important 
not to prosecute hastily, lest there be acquittal and the principle non bis in idem 
apply. To be sure, the alleged offender may benefit from a potential gap in the 
system if the prosecutorial authorities in the State where he is present lack 
enough evidence to indict, yet another State (which does have enough 
evidence) fails to request extradition. Such a turn of events, characterized by 
neither dedere nor judicare, would produce a fiasco. 
Can a State exercise criminal jurisdiction over war criminals in absentia? 
U [L] iterally hundreds of war crimes cases" were tried in France and Belgium 
after both world wars in the absence of the accused.89 Article 12 of the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (sitting at Nuremberg) 
expressly allowed the Tribunal to take proceedings against a person in his 
absence.9o Bormann, who was not in custody, was indicted accordingly, and 
the Tribunal issued a special Order making it possible to go on with his trialj91 
ultimately Bormann was convicted and sentenced to death.92 A fictitious 
assertion of criminal jurisdiction over war crimes is apparently permissible. 
However, since Bormann has never been caught, his sentence only exposed 
the futility of in absentia proceedings. It is not clear what advantages are to be 
gained from such an academic exercise if the accused is not within grasp. In 
any event, the Nuremberg precedent was not followed in the case of the 
Yugoslav Tribunal, which does not possess jurisdiction to try persons in 
absentia.93 
Jurisdiction to Enforce. Jurisdiction to enforce in the domain of war crimes 
means, primarily, punishment of persons convicted and sentenced by a 
competent court. Usually, trials of war criminals are held and sentences served 
within the boundaries of the same country. Yet, by agreement a State may keep 
in its prison facilities offenders convicted and sentenced by an international 
tribunal,94 or even by a national court of a foreign country.95 
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Jurisdiction to enforce also relates to preventive and other coercive 
measures taken by a State with a view to the suppression of war crimes. Under 
the universality principle, every State is empowered to take these steps against 
international offenders. However, the empowerment is embedded in the 
assumption that the State is acting within its territory (including vessels and 
aircraft registered therein) or on the high seas. The universality principle does 
not authorize a State to take coercive action within the territory of another 
State without the latter's consent. Differently put, the police of one State are 
not allowed to enter the territory of another (absent consent) in order to arrest 
an individual, "not even to enforce law that is subject to universal 
jurisdiction.,,96 
It is true that in egregious circumstances there have been occasions in which 
enforcement measures were carried out within the territory of another State 
without its consent. The abduction of Eichmann from Argentina for trial in 
Israel is a leading example. But it must be borne in mind that the crimes he 
perpetrated were staggering and that in realistic terms abduction "was the only 
means of obtaining physical jurisdiction over" him.97 Security Council 
Resolution 138 (1960), which resolved the dispute over the abduction-and 
which declared (quite disingenuously) that "if repeated," the acts affecting the 
sovereignty of a Member State may endanger international peace and 
security--did not fail to note "the concern of people in all countries that 
Eichmann should be brought to appropriate justice for the crimes of which he is 
accused."98 The Eichmann precedent must be considered overall as a rare 
exception rather than the rule: the rule of enforcement is and remains based on 
respect for the sovereignty of foreign States. 
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